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was perfect, nor that there is no room for 
improvement in American life. It is clear 
in his memoir that he has found life better 
here than anywhere else he has been. But 
he also warns that this life can only be kept 
so by vigilance against all forms of tyranny 
over mind, body, and spirit. 
Reviewed by WALTER TROHAN 
Spencer’s Tragedy 
The Principles of Ethics, by Herbert 
Spencer, Indianapolk, Ind. : Liberty 
Press, 1978. Volume 1,  613 pp.; 
Volume 2, 521 pp.  $18.00 for  the set. 
AT DINNER WITH Huxley, Spencer mention- 
ed that he had once written a tragedy. 
Huxley immediately replied that he knew 
what the plot must be: a beautiful theory 
gets murdered by a nasty fact. Spencer 
himself delighted in retelling Huxley’s 
barb, displaying thereby both his good- 
humor and self-awareness. What he was 
probably not aware of was that he actually 
did write a tragedy with Huxley’s plot. In 
The Principles of Ethics the beautiful 
theory is that an individual’s conduct is to 
be judged by how well it furthers the in- 
dividual’s survival. The nasty fact is that 
much conduct that furthers survival is 
morally repugnant both to Spencer and to 
most civilized people. Like many a good 
doctor, Spencer operated on the theory in 
order to save it from the attack of the fact. 
After the operation, the theory was so 
disfigured by qualifications and incon- 
sistencies that few people paid attention to 
it, preferring to remember it as it was in its 
original pure simplicity. 
If fairness to an author means 
remembering what he actually wrote, with 
all the qualifications and inconsistencies, 
then posterity has not been fair to Spencer. 
The best way to redress the wrong is to give 
Modem Age 
a critical account of what is actually there, 
beginning with Spencer’s aims, proceeding 
through his means and ending with his 
casuistical claims. Spencer set himself two 
aims in writing The Principles of Ethics. 
Providing a scientific basis for ethics was 
the first. The second was to point out 
where the concrete injunctions of tradi- 
tional morality were incomplete or in er- 
ror. Ethics can be. “scientific” in several 
senses. To fulfill his first aim, Spencer 
wanted to derive, an ethics that was “scien- 
tific” in two. The supernatural basis of 
ethics had, Spencer thought, irretrievably 
lost its authority. If society was to avoid the 
disaster of lacking a code of ethics, a new 
code would have to be developed on a non- 
supernatural basis. Thus ethics was first to 
be “scientific” in the sense of having its 
source in nature rather than the super- 
natural. Secondarily, ethics was also to be 
“scientific” in that the method for justify- 
ing injunctions in ethics should parallel 
that for justifying laws in natural science. 
According to Spencer’s conception of 
scientific method, science proceeded first 
from inductions that yielded “vague but 
partially true notions,” then to generaliza- 
tions derived by abstract reasoning that 
omits “qualifying circumstances,” and 
finally to a full system that takes account of 
the previously omitted qualifying cir- 
cumstances. Though this may be the order 
for discovering scientific rules of conduct, 
it is not the order he uses in the presenta- 
tion of those rules in his Principles. The 
book is divided into six parts: the first 
devoted to fairly abstract reasoning about 
the criteria for judging conduct; the se- 
cond devoted to anthropological induc- 
tions concerning various ethical issues; and 
the last four returning again to abstract 
reasoning, but here directed toward 
establishing more concrete ethical injunc- 
tions. The divergence between the order of 
discovery and the order in presentation is 
probably due to Spencer’s fear that he 
would not live to finish the whole work. 
What Spencer wrote first and what appears 
as the first part of the Principles is what 




abstract derivation of the general criteria 
for evaluating conduct. 
To evaluate Spencer’s success at giving a 
scientific basis to ethics it is easier to con- 
sider the parts of the work in the order he 
prescribed as scientific rather than the ac- 
tual order of presentation. Begin, then, 
with the part of the book called “The In- 
ductions of Ethics.” Here Spencer attempts 
to learn what ethical conduct is in regard 
to broad topics, such as aggression, 
generosity, and temperance, by comparing 
the conduct of primitive societies with that 
of advanced societies. Any conduct that is 
absent in primitive societies but present in 
advanced is good, while the opposite is 
bad. As noted earlier, Spencer claimed 
that induction in science yields only vague 
notions. Whether or not Spencer’s claim is 
true in general, it certainly is true of his 
own inductions in the Principles. For the 
most part each of the chapters consists of 
many pages devoted to summaries of the 
practices of diverse cultures, followed by a 
page or two devoted to the moral of the 
srary. The ethnngaphic materia! is 
fascinating in its own right, but often has 
little relevance to the morals which are in- 
stead briefly defended by abstract reason- 
ing about what sort of conduct would pro- 
mote a developed society. No matter what 
conduct Spencer’s reasoning approves, he 
finds support in the ethnographic data. If 
bad conduct, such as cannibalism, is per- 
formed by primitives, then this confirms 
that the conduct is bad. If good conduct is 
performed, such as restraint in child- 
bearing among the Figians and the Motu- 
Motu, then this confirms that the conduct 
is good since “even they” do it. Either way, 
the ethnographic data “supports” what 
Spencer believes for other reasons. The 
weakness of the method of the inductions is 
nowhere clearer than when Spencer loses 
patience with the imperialism of England. 
Looking around him he saw “...a state of 
the world in which naked barbarians and 
barbarians in skins are being overrun by 
barbarians in broadcloth.” 
Spencer himself recognized to some ex- 
tent the weakness of the inductions. The 
portion of the Principles that he preferred 
was the more abstract part in which he 
derived and defended his criteria for 
evaluating conduct. He begins by discuss- 
ing a criterion that is commonly associated 
with his name: that conduct is to be judged 
by how far it lengthens or shortens the 
lifespan of the agent. This criterion, 
however, is quickly rejected by Spencer 
because it would have required him to 
judge as more advanced, creatures he 
believed clearly to be more primitive. For 
instance, “an oyster, adapted by its struc- 
ture to the diffused food contained in the 
water it draws in, and shielded by its shell 
from nearly all dangers, may live longer 
than a cuttlefish, which has such superior 
powers of dealing with numerous con- 
tingencies ...” In deference to the cut- 
tlefish, Spencer concludes that conduct is 
to be judged according to its impact on 
both the length and breadth of life, where 
“breadth” means the number of different 
activities the organism can perform. 
As the first and most fundamental of 
breadth of life” criterion merits special at- 
tention. Even assuming that it is possible to 
obtain some measure of the number of ac- 
tivities an individual can perform, there 
still remain a couple of fundamental pro- 
blems with the criterion. The most crucial 
problem is that nothing in nature implies 
that a variety of activities is better or more 
advanced than the lack of such variety. As 
Spencer himself notes, simple creatures 
often survive longer than the more com- 
plex. A person may prefer simplicity to 
variety without being incoherent and there 
is nothing in evolution (at least nothing 
noted by Spencer) that implies that such a 
person is wrong. Like the magician pulling 
the rabbit from a hat, Spencer only gets 
from evolution what he has first put into it. 
Part of the appeal of the “length and 
breadth” criterion for Spencer was his im- 
pli& belief that the criterion directly im- 
plies the superiority of advanced society. 
The implication, however, is not direct. It 
requires the missing assumption that in an 
advanced society each individual performs 
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a greater variety of activities than in a 
primitive society. The assumption may be 
true, but it is by no means obvious. It 
would be false, for instance, if specializa- 
tion resulted in each individual performing 
fewer different activities even though in the 
society as a whole, more different activities 
were being performed. Oster and Wilson 
in their recent Caste and Ecology in Social 
Insects claim that, for many individual 
non-social insects, the variety of activities 
performed is equal to that of an entire col- 
ony of social insects. As a result each in- 
dividual colony member performs a 
smaller variety of activities than does the 
individual non-social insect. Thus, even 
assuming the soundness of the “length and 
breadth” criterion, Spencer still needed to 
defend, not just assume, the superiority of 
modem specialized societies. 
On the sole basis of the length and 
breadth of life criterion, Spencer would 
have been unable to praise much conduct 
that he thought good and blame much 
conduct that he thought bad. The expe- 
dient, of course, is to add two more 
criteria. Thus his second criterion is that 
good conduct furthers the survival of the 
species through the procreation and nur- 
ture of healthy, able offspring, while the 
third criterion is that good conduct in- 
volves “mutual help.” If the first criterion 
might be thought to follow from nature, 
the latter two are more transparently ad 
hoc. In any ethical dilemma that people 
seriously worry about, these criteria can be 
used to justify either course of conduct. A 
once beautiful theory has been qualified 
into vacuousness. 
The ambiguity of the inductions from 
ethnology and the ad hocness of the deduc- 
tions from nature doom Spencer’s attempt 
to give ethics a new authority in science. 
Failure in this first aim implies that only 
limited success could be had in achieving 
the second: without securely grounded 
Modem Age 
criteria for judging conduct Spencer could 
not with moral force show where the con- 
crete injunctions of traditional morality 
were incomplete or in error. What he 
could and did do was to lay out with 
remarkable perceptiveness the conse- 
quences of various modes of conduct. 
Entertaining, as well as edifying, are the 
discussions in praise of variety in food and 
travel and the discussions in blame of ex- 
cess fiction reading and overcultured 
women. Also engrossing are the frequent 
references to the exotic both in people and 
in animals. Of more serious value are the 
frequently incisive critiques of the positions 
of the positions of others. Outstanding in 
this regard is his discussion of the in- 
coherence of pure altruism. On a more 
rhetorical level, he is also effective in argu- 
ing against the hypocrisy of the Christians 
who advocated imperialism and war. 
This new edition of thefiinciples follows 
the text of the 1897 edition published by D. 
Appleton and Company. As is usual with 
the products of Liberty Press, the quality 
of the paper and binding is high, the price 
low. Tibor Machan’s brief introduction is 
useful, though he may confuse the casual 
reader when he describes as “egoism” 
Spencer’s avowed compromise between 
egoism and altruism. Even if the Principles 
is properly described as a failure it would 
be wrong to be too critical of its author. 
Spencer did not fail because he was stupid, 
ill-informed, or malign. On the contrary, 
the pages of the Principles display a lively 
intelligence, a wealth of empirical 
knowledge, and a good-natured humanity. 
Rather Spencer failed because his task was 
so difficult. The Princzjdes should thus be 
of interest not just to historians of thought 
but also to all those who would themselves 
take up Spencer’s task. 
Reviewed by ARTHUR M. DIAMOND, JR. 
421 
LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED
